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For years, experimental philosophers have attempted to discern whether laypeople find
free will compatible with a scientifically deterministic understanding of the universe, yet
no consensus has emerged. The present work provides one potential explanation for
these discrepant findings: People are strongly motivated to preserve free will and moral
responsibility, and thus do not have stable, logically rigorous notions of free will. Seven
studies support this hypothesis by demonstrating that a variety of logically irrelevant
(but motivationally relevant) features influence compatibilist judgments. In Study 1,
participants who were asked to consider the possibility that our universe is deterministic
were more compatibilist than those not asked to consider this possibility, suggesting
that determinism poses a threat to moral responsibility, which increases compatibilist
responding (thus reducing the threat). In Study 2, participants who considered concrete
instances of moral behavior found compatibilist free will more sufficient for moral
responsibility than participants who were asked about moral responsibility more
generally. In Study 3a, the order in which participants read free will and determinism
descriptions influenced their compatibilist judgments–and only when the descriptions
had moral significance: Participants were more likely to report that determinism was
compatible with free will than that free will was compatible with determinism. In Study 3b,
participants who read the free will description first (the more compatibilist group) were
particularly likely to confess that their beliefs in free will and moral responsibility and their
disbelief in determinism influenced their conclusion. In Study 4, participants reduced
their compatibilist beliefs after reading a passage that argued that moral responsibility
could be preserved even in the absence of free will. Participants also reported that
immaterial souls were compatible with scientific determinism, most strongly among
immaterial soul believers (Study 5), and evaluated information about the capacities
of primates in a biased manner favoring the existence of human free will (Study 6).
These results suggest that people do not have one intuition about whether free will is
compatible with determinism. Instead, people report that free will is compatible with
determinism when desiring to uphold moral responsibility. Recommendations for future
work are discussed.
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INTRODUCTION
A recent Marist Poll (2011) found that 73% of American citizens
below the age of 45 believe in soul mates. Now imagine this
piqued the interest of philosophers and they began to debate
soul mates. Careful, rigorous analysis by philosophers might yield
differences of opinion as to whether soul mates entail immaterial
souls or are compatible with a purely materialistic concept of
human mating. Some might then collect nuanced data about
what laypersons believe about soul mates. But perhaps layperson
beliefs are not based on scrutiny of metaphysical assumptions
and instead stem from romantic notions, Hollywood movies,
attempts to rationalize romantic breakups, or mere wishful
thinking.
The present research was driven by the hypothesis that
layperson responses to experimental philosophy questions about
free will and compatibilism may likewise yield answers reflecting
assorted motives and romanticized notions. Efforts to establish
whether the folk are naïve compatibilists or incompatibilists
may misfire, in part because people fail to understand the
theoretical issues and base their answers on factors other than
what philosophers seek to illuminate. Specifically, we will argue
that desires to uphold free will and moral responsibility influence
judgments about compatibilism.
The Scholars
Among professional academic philosophers, there is a divide
over whether free will and moral responsibility are compatible
with a deterministic universe, that is, a universe in which the
laws of nature and a complete description of the universe at
any point in time logically entail the state of the universe at any
other point in time (definition from Haggard et al., 2015). Those
who believe free will and moral responsibility are compatible
with a deterministic universe (compatibilists) typically define free
will as the ability to perform actions on the basis of rational
deliberation in the absence of coercion, whereas those who
believe that determinism precludes free will (incompatibilists)
typically define free will as entailing the genuine possibility of
acting in different possible ways despite precisely the same causal
history (also called libertarian free will; Haggard et al., 2015)1.
Incompatibilists argue that without alternative possibilities for
action, people cannot be fully responsible for their actions (e.g.,
van Inwagen, 1983; Pereboom, 2006). Whereas compatibilists
argue that their more lenient version of free will is sufficient for
moral responsibility (e.g., Frankfurt, 1969; Wolf, 1990; Dennett,
2004). Virtually everyone agrees that humans have the ability
to perform actions on the basis of rational deliberation. The
disagreement is whether this kind of freedom deserves the name
“free will,” a term that imbues human behavior with moral
significance (though see Fischer (2007) for an alternate view
of moral responsibility). Note that both incompatibilists and
compatibilists agree that free will (whatever it is) is a necessary
(but probably not sufficient) condition for moral responsibility.
1There are different types of compatibilism/incompatibilism and multiple types of
determinism (e.g., Deery et al., 2014), but these are the definitions we are using for
the present work.
The Folk
In recent years, experimental philosophers have begun testing
the intuitions of common people (often called “the folk”)
regarding the necessary features of moral responsibility. To the
surprise of many, this work has demonstrated contradictory
results regarding lay intuitions about free will. For example,
Nahmias et al. (2005) found that the majority of participants
judged that specific actors acted of their own free will and
were morally responsible in deterministic scenarios. Nichols and
Knobe (2007) later suggested that compatibilist responses may
represent affective reactions to specific stories about immoral
behaviors and that in a more abstract, theoretical context, people
are largely incompatibilists.
Continuing the debate, Murray and Nahmias (2014) argued
that incompatibilist responses are due to a mistaken view of
determinism that assumes that mental states are bypassed in the
chain of events leading to human behavior, a misunderstanding
termed ‘bypassing.’ In a meta-analysis of 30 studies, Feltz
and Cova (2014) concluded that affective reactions may have
little effect on compatibilist responding. Others have outlined
myriad methodological challenges such as long and complicated
stimuli and misunderstandings about the inevitability of causally
determined outcomes (e.g., Turri, 2017a). The original 2005
paper by Nahmias and colleagues has now been cited 336 times
(as of this sentence being written). That high number is partly
a tribute to the importance of their work but also reflects the
continuing, unresolved debate.
The Problem
We propose one explanation for the discrepant findings
regarding folk compatibilism: People are motivated to uphold
their beliefs in free will and moral responsibility. Most laypersons
believe in free will (e.g., Sarkissian et al., 2010) and disbelieve
determinism (Nichols, 2004; Nichols and Knobe, 2007; Turri,
2017b), and people tend to evaluate information in a biased
manner that favors their desired beliefs (e.g., Lord et al., 1979;
Kunda, 1990). Thus, people are likely to report that free will is
possible regardless of experimentally imposed constraints (Feltz
and Millan, 2013), particularly when desiring to uphold moral
responsibility (Clark et al., 2014, 2017).
Motivated Beliefs
Judgments with moral significance (an unavoidable feature of
compatibilism judgments) are particularly fertile ground for
motivated cognition (e.g., Haidt, 2001; Ditto et al., 2009; Clark
et al., 2015). Though motivated cognition has a variety of
meanings (see Kunda, 1990), here, we mean reasoning processes
that favor preferred conclusions such that conscious beliefs and
attitudes are shaped by desires. In other words, what people
want to believe is true affects what they actually believe is true.
Even when it comes to logic-based judgments, people seem
incapable of fully escaping the influence of their own prior beliefs
and desired truths: People are more likely to rate classically
structured logical syllogisms as sound when the conclusions
are consistent with their moral beliefs than when they oppose
their beliefs, regardless of their actual soundness (Gampa et al.,
2016). In compatibilism research, people likely struggle with the
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hypothetical analysis that requires accepting the apparently false
premise of determinism.
The vast majority of people believe strongly in free will
(Nadelhoffer et al., 2014) and that our universe is indeterministic
(Nichols and Knobe, 2007). In fact, children as young as 4 years
old demonstrate a belief in the ability to do otherwise (Nichols,
2004). It is problematic, then, that most (if not all) compatibilism
studies (e.g., Nahmias et al., 2005, 2006, 2007; Nichols and Knobe,
2007; Feltz and Cokely, 2008; Roskies and Nichols, 2008) first
present participants with a description of determinism (which
they would be motivated to reject) and then ask whether free
will and moral responsibility are compatible with that described
universe (which they would be motivated to accept). People
cannot be expected to logically and dispassionately evaluate
arguments with apparently false premises, especially when those
premises pose potential threats to core beliefs such as free will
and moral responsibility (much like you wouldn’t expect a devout
Christian to make rational judgments about creationism).
Motivated Beliefs in Free Will and Moral
Responsibility
In addition to this complication, people tend to attribute more
responsibility to individuals when motivated to hold them
morally responsible. For example, past work has shown that
people attributed more causal control to a speeding driver in a car
accident when his reason for speeding was nefarious than morally
admirable (Alicke, 1992), and more intention and personal
causality to performers of actions with harmful consequences
than performers of identical actions with helpful consequences
(e.g., Knobe, 2003, 2006; Leslie et al., 2006; Knobe and Fraser,
2008).
Most problematic for compatibilism research, people attribute
more free will to performers of morally bad actions than morally
good actions and morally neutral actions (Clark et al., 2018;
Everett et al., 2018; Feldman et al., 2016), and pondering morally
bad actions leads people to increase their belief in the free will
of all humankind (Clark et al., 2014). Thus, not only are people
motivated to maintain the possibility of free will because they
generally believe in free will, but they are particularly likely to
assert free will when their judgment has moral significance, as
compatibilism judgments do.
There is already quite a bit of evidence that motivations
to maintain human moral responsibility influence compatibilist
responding, though such results are not always interpreted
this way. For example, Nichols and Knobe (2007) found
that participants who were asked to evaluate an immoral
behavior were far more compatibilist than participants asked
to evaluate moral responsibility in an abstract manner. This
spurred a debate about whether affect influences compatibilist
judgments, with some studies finding no or small effects
of affect on compatibilist judgments (e.g., Feltz et al., 2009;
Feltz and Millan, 2013; Feltz and Cova, 2014). However,
in these subsequent studies, both the high and low affect
conditions involved morally bad behaviors that simply varied in
severity. Therefore, both conditions likely activated motivations
to maintain moral responsibility. This raises an important
distinction between prior work and the present work. We do
not contend that generalized affect necessarily influences free
will judgments (though it might). Rather, we contend that
compatibilist judgments may often reflect bias toward preserving
free will, particularly so as to preserve moral responsibility
(though there are likely many reasons and motives for free will
beliefs).
Consistent with this suggestion, Roskies and Nichols (2008)
found that people were far more likely to report that free
choice and moral responsibility were possible in a deterministic
universe if that deterministic universe was their own (i.e., the
universe inhabited by humans) than if it were an alternate
universe. Again, these results suggest that people are primarily
concerned with preserving the ability to hold others (fellow
humans) morally responsible. As suggested by Roskies and
Nichols, “the intuition that we are in fact morally responsible
is a non-negotiable intuition.” We agree, and this is precisely
why the folk are incapable of evaluating deterministic contexts
for free action in a rational, philosophically sophisticated
manner.
Motives to hold people morally responsible may even
influence how people interpret determinism. In Nahmias et al.
(2005), all participants were given identical descriptions of a
supercomputer that can predict the entire state of the universe at
any point in time with 100% accuracy. For some participants, the
supercomputer then accurately predicted an immoral behavior
(a bank robbery), whereas others read that the supercomputer
accurately predicted a neutral (jogging) or positive behavior
(saving a child). Only in the case of the morally bad behavior did
the majority of participants insist that the actor had the possibility
of not performing the behavior. This may mean that people reject
deterministic descriptions that assert the inability to do otherwise
when motivated to hold others morally responsible. Even if
experimental philosophers can get participants to comprehend
determinism, participants may be unwilling to accept and apply
the premise, particularly when evaluating moral responsibility for
misdeeds.
Some have suggested that motivated reasoning can even be
found among the most disciplined and sophisticated thinkers,
namely philosophers. Schwitzgebel and Cushman (2012) found
that the moral judgments of professional academic philosophers
were equally if not more unstable than those of non-
philosophers. This is in line with the expertise paradox in
the motivated reasoning literature (e.g., Taber and Lodge,
2006; Kahan et al., 2012; Liu, 2013; Liu and Ditto, 2013):
perceiving oneself as more knowledgeable and gaining more
knowledge on a particular issue can actually increase biased
responding, because expertise in a particular area can lead
to more skillful post hoc rationalization of intuitive moral
judgments (e.g., Haidt, 2001). In fact, one analysis suggests
that compatibilism emerged among philosophers because it is
motivationally attractive, specifically, to philosophers who have
accepted determinism. As noted by Nichols (2007), among the
twenty major philosophers of the early modern period, not
one indeterminist was compatibilist. This suggests that when
people acknowledge the possible reality of determinism, they may
construct compatibilism as a means of avoiding the potential
threat to moral responsibility.
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Comprehension and Ambiguity
One final reason to expect compatibilist judgments to
be particularly vulnerable to motivated reasoning is their
complicated and abstract nature. Even professional philosophers
struggle to agree on definitions of the central concepts (i.e., free
will, the ability to do otherwise) and the proper words to use (or
avoid) in thought experiments. Participants in compatibilism
research have great difficulty comprehending exactly what
determinism entails, and ambiguity increases biased responding
(e.g., Dunning et al., 1989). Many of these studies do not
measure or report comprehension failure rates, but of those
that do, 10–60% of participants fail comprehension checks
about determinism (e.g., Nichols and Knobe, 2007; Murray and
Nahmias, 2014). Given that some participants likely answer
correctly by guessing, it can be assumed that even more fail to
fully understand the determinism scenarios in these studies,
despite the effort and care experimental philosophers put into
writing these descriptions.
The term free will is likely not a rigorously defined
philosophical term. There are probably many folk theories that
vary both between (Feltz and Cokely, 2009; Schulz et al., 2011)
and within individuals (Deery et al., 2014), and it is probable
that many of them are inconsistent with each other. Because
of the abstract and complex nature of free will, the folk are
likely incapable of furnishing meaningful conclusions about the
concept. It is quite possible that a rudimentary notion of “free
will” is a natural output of the human brain (see McCauley, 2011
for a discussion of “natural”), but that this representation is not
philosophically coherent. This intuition is then complicated by
more abstract teachings and discussions of free will as one would
encounter among friends and in the news (say, about free will
and the latest results of neuroscience). The resulting belief is
likely an incoherent series of intuitions about free will that change
from setting to setting (and, in particular, between everyday
conversations and more elevated philosophical discourse).
Integrative Summary and Present
Research
In the present paper, we contend that responses to abstract
dilemmas posed in experimental philosophy thought
experiments may be guided less by careful reasoning (a
point that many would concede) than by desires to uphold
free will and moral responsibility. Though likely many feelings,
attitudes, and desires influence free will beliefs, we suggest that
motives to uphold moral responsibility are one reason people
assert their belief in free will.
Overall, we find the current state of the debate best
characterized by Deery et al. (2014): Most people are probably
both compatibilists and incompatibilists, and though these
positions appear contradictory, they are likely not psychologically
contradictory. Philosophers have devoted a great deal of careful
thought and debate to various specific definitions of free will,
whereas the folk likely have not given it much thought at
all and are reasonably satisfied with the conclusion that it
exists, regardless of what it is. Indeed, some philosophers have
suggested that people have free-will-no-matter-what intuitions
(Feltz and Millan, 2013) and non-negotiable beliefs in the human
capacities to make choices and control their actions (Nahmias
and Thompson, 2014). This may mean that people will assert that
free will and moral responsibility exist regardless of deterministic
or fatalistic constraints.
To summarize, people believe strongly in human free will and
that the universe is not deterministic. People are also motivated
to maintain moral responsibility, particularly when considering
concrete instances of moral behavior. Crucially for the present
analysis, these beliefs and motives may irrationally constrain
related judgments. Therefore, it is unclear whether people ascribe
free will to actors in deterministic scenarios because of rational,
compatibilist considerations regarding the necessary features
of free will and moral responsibility–or because they reject
the premise of a deterministic universe and are motivated to
maintain the possibilities of free will and moral responsibility.
In many cases, they may not even be able to comprehend the
counterfactual deterministic world they are asked to consider.
Unlike philosophers, everyday people do not give much thought
to these complicated philosophical issues, and their intuitions
are therefore of limited philosophical significance (e.g., Mele,
2003, 2008). To be sure, they are not completely useless,
but they probably have more psychological than philosophical
significance.
Across seven studies, we demonstrate that compatibilist
judgments are influenced by a variety of factors that are
irrelevant to the logical compatibility of determinism and moral
responsibility. Instead, such judgments often stem from motives
to preserve human free will and moral responsibility. Overall,
our results highlight the need for extreme caution in interpreting
the responses of ordinary people to philosophical questions
regarding free will, moral responsibility, and determinism,
because their responses are characterized by misunderstandings
and bias. We conclude with implications and recommendations
for experimental philosophy.
STUDY 1
Study 1 tested whether having people consider the possibility
that they live in a deterministic universe (rather than an
indeterministic one) would increase compatibilist responses.
In principle, compatibilist notions ought to be unaffected
by considerations of whether our universe happens to be
deterministic. Compatibilist notions ought to be based purely
on considerations regarding the features of physical causality
and/or moral responsibility. If contemplating the possibility
that our own universe is deterministic increases compatibilist
responding, this would suggest that the possible truth of
determinism poses a threat to moral responsibility, which
participants then combat by being more compatibilist. Ordinary
folk may not be alone in this. Nichols (2007) proposed that
compatibilism became popular among determinist philosophers
for much the same reason, namely the wish to preserve moral
responsibility.
First, all participants read a paragraph stating that humans
have free will and can be held morally responsible. Participants
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then read either an argument2 stating that the universe is
deterministic or that it is indeterministic3. Then they were asked
whether the second argument (either supporting determinism
or indeterminism) could possibly be true if people have free
will and can be held morally responsible as stated in the first
argument. Last, participants in both conditions were asked
whether determinism is possible if humans have free will and
can be held morally responsible (i.e., whether compatibilism is
possible). This second question was identical across the two
conditions. The response to this question should be unrelated to
which argument they read, so any differences between conditions
might indicate something about the motivations arising from the
possibility of determinism.
We first predicted that participants in the indeterminism
condition would be more likely to state that their argument
was possible if people have free will and can be held morally
responsible than participants in the determinism condition. This,
of course, would be unsurprising (and fairly uninteresting),
as most philosophers (though not all) would concur that
people can be morally responsible in an indeterminist universe4.
However, we also predicted that participants in the determinism
condition would be more compatibilist than participants in the
indeterminism condition. If the possibility of determinism poses
a threat to moral responsibility, people may be more likely to
reconcile free will and determinism when asked to consider the
realistic possibility that humans live in a deterministic universe.
This would suggest that compatibilist responding is motivated, in
part, by desires to uphold moral responsibility.
Methods
In an online study, 106 undergraduates at a southwestern
United States university (84 female, Mage = 20.55) first read a
passage stating that humans have free will, “. . .Humans are highly
intelligent, complex beings with the capacity for free will. . . They
2We understand that the word “argument” has a precise meaning in philosophy
and can only be evaluated in certain ways (e.g., valid or invalid). In this paper,
we use the word “argument” to refer to a statement or reason for or against a
point (e.g., Merriam-Webster, Oxford, dictionary.com). We estimated that fewer
than 7% of participants in our samples were likely to have taken Critical Thinking
courses. Additionally, in open-ended responses, participants did not object or
comment on our usage of the word argument or the available evaluations (e.g.,
“can the argument be true?”).
3In recent years, sophisticated philosophical thought has developed multiple
perspectives on determinism, and so it is increasingly difficult to provide a
simple operational definition that laypersons can understand but that all or most
philosophers would accept. Our use of the term harks back to Laplace’s (1814)
original thought experiment, which asserted that if a super-intelligent mind knew
the disposition of every particle in the universe at any given moment plus all the
laws of nature, it could calculate with 100% accuracy the state of the universe
at any other point in time. We have emphasized the inevitability aspect as the
inspiring but contentious aspect of determinism. Presumably no one thinks that
such calculations will be done any time soon, if ever, and indeed the failures
of prediction despite accumulated scientific knowledge continue to shock and
dishearten social scientists. The possibility of calculating the future with complete
accuracy based on knowledge of the present in our view entails that each future
event is already inevitable and indeed has been so since time immemorial. Of
course, the inevitable future rests on causal processes working through people’s
choices and actions, so this differs from the fatalistic view that the future will turn
out the same regardless of what oneself does.
4Here we mean indeterminist in the sense that human actions are not fully
determined, not indeterminist in the sense of randomness or uncertainty.
sometimes deserve to be praised for good things they freely decide
to do and deserve to be blamed for bad things they freely decide to
do5.”
Participants were then randomly assigned to read one of two
passages, which argued either that the universe is deterministic,
“. . .All human thoughts and their corresponding behaviors are
inevitable consequences of prior events. If past events had happened
differently, then a person would have had different thoughts
and desires, which would have led to different decisions” or
indeterministic, “. . .Human thoughts and their corresponding
behaviors are not always inevitable consequences of prior events.
Even if past events had happened the exact same way, a person
could have different thoughts and desires, which could lead to
different decisions.” Descriptions were written by the authors,
though aspects are similar to Nichols and Knobe (2007).
Participants were then asked two comprehension questions:
“According to the argument, do humans’ thoughts influence
their behavior?,” the correct answer being “yes” in both
conditions (henceforth referred to as bypass comprehension),
and “According to the argument, if specific events occurred,
would a human make a particular decision with 100% certainty?,”
the correct answer being “yes” in the deterministic condition and
“no” in the indeterministic condition (henceforth referred to as
otherwise comprehension). Participants were also given “I don’t
know” options.
Participants then responded to two questions that served as
our main dependent variables. The first question asked whether
the argument they read was compatible with free will: “If humans
have free will and can be morally responsible as specified above,
is it possible for the argument to be true?” with response
options “yes,” “no,” and “I don’t know.” Thus, participants in
the deterministic condition were asked whether determinism was
compatible with free will and participants in the indeterminism
condition were asked whether indeterminism was compatible
with free will.
The second question (posed to all participants) simply asked
whether determinism was compatible with free will: “If humans
have free will and can be morally responsible as specified
above, is it possible for all human behavior to be inevitable
consequences of prior causes?” with response options “yes,” “no,”
and “I don’t know.” Participants then completed the free will,
scientific determinism, and fatalistic determinism subscales of the
Free Will and Determinism Scale (FAD+; Paulhus and Carey,
2011), which measure beliefs in free will, scientific determinism,
and fatalistic determinism. Last, participants responded to an
attention check and variety of demographic questions.
Results
Comprehension Checks
The majority of participants passed the bypass comprehension
check in both the determinism condition (77.8%) and the
indeterminism condition (82.7%). Participants had a more
difficult time with otherwise comprehension. Whereas 80.8% of
participants in the indeterminism condition correctly understood
5For space purposes, exact phrasings of all passages are reported in Supplementary
Material.
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that even given past events, humans might not make a particular
decision, only 40.7% of participants in the determinism condition
correctly understood that if specific events occurred, humans
would make a particular decision. Comprehension problems are
a recurring issue in this and similar work. In the present work,
it was not always feasible or possible to test for moderation by
comprehension, nor was it always feasible or possible to report
results separately for participants who passed comprehension
checks (due to small cell sizes). Rather than report each set
of results multiple times with various subsets of participants,
all main results with comprehenders only are reported in
Supplementary Material. No exclusions were made for any
results reported in the main text.
Argument Compatibility
For Studies 1–3b, data were analyzed with multinomial logistic
regression, a statistical test that allows for nominal dependent
variables with more than two response options (e.g., “yes,” “no,”
and “I don’t know”), and compares the relative rate of one
response to another between levels of the independent variable.
Participants in the indeterminism condition were significantly
more likely to report that their argument was compatible with
free will than that their argument was incompatible relative to
those in the determinism condition, with a medium to large effect
size (see Figure 1 and Table 1)6.
6In all studies reporting odds ratios as estimates of effect sizes (Studies 1–3b),
classifications of small, medium, and large were interpreted from Chen et al.
(2010).
Determinism Compatibility
Participants in the determinism condition were also significantly
more likely to report that determinism was compatible with
free will than that determinism was incompatible with free
will relative to those who read the indeterminism argument,
with a medium to large effect (see Figure 1 and Table 1).
For participants in the indeterminism condition, the pattern
was reversed with more participants saying determinism was
incompatible with free will than that it was compatible.
Discussion
Although participants were generally more likely to report
that indeterminism was compatible with free will than that
determinism was compatible with free will, these differences
were fairly small, and the majority of participants (even those
in the determinism condition) reported that their argument
was compatible with free will. These results appear to suggest
that people are intuitive compatibilists–though they also fit
the view that people are mainly guided by the motivation to
preserve belief in free will and moral responsibility. Consistent
with the latter interpretation, our second dependent variable
suggests that what appeared to be compatibilism may actually
be motivated responding driven by desires to maintain belief in
moral responsibility.
There were large differences in compatibilist attitudes between
the two argument conditions on the more general question about
whether determinism is compatible with free will. Participants
who were previously asked to consider the possibility that
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
Is determinism compatible with free will?
Is argument compatible with free will?
Participants who read determinism argument
Yes No Don't Know
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
Is determinism compatible with free will?
Is argument compatible with free will?
Participants who read indeterminism argument
Yes No Don't Know
FIGURE 1 | Argument compatibility and determinism compatibility responses within each argument condition in Study 1.
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TABLE 1 | Study 1 argument compatibility and determinism compatibility responses by condition.
Determinism
condition
Indeterminism
condition
OR b SE Wald p 95% CI
Argument compatibility
Yes 59.3% 82.7%
No 24.1% 7.7% 4.37 1.47 0.62 5.70 0.017 1.30, 14.65
Don’t Know 16.7% 9.6% 2.42 0.88 0.61 2.13 0.144 0.74, 7.91
Determinism compatibility
Yes 44.4% 21.2%
No 25.9% 53.8% 0.23 −1.47 0.49 9.06 0.003 0.09, 0.60
Don’t know 29.6% 25.0% 0.56 −0.57 0.52 1.21 0.272 0.20, 1.57
‘Yes’ response is reference category.
they live in a deterministic universe maintained relatively high
levels of agreement with compatibilism when asked about
compatibilism more generally. In contrast, participants who had
not previously considered the possible truth of determinism
reported very low levels of agreement with compatibilism on the
more general question.
These results support our hypothesis that compatibilist
attitudes may often reflect desires to maintain the possibility
of moral responsibility (including the associated assumption of
free will) and may suggest that the mere consideration of the
possibility of determinism leads people to change the rules about
the necessary features of moral responsibility. When there was
no threat of determinism (and hence no potential threat to moral
responsibility), participants were much less likely to reconcile
determinism with the capacity for moral responsibility.
It is also worth noting the high frequency of “I don’t know”
responses and failures to comprehend determinism. We propose
three possible explanations. (1) We did a poor job explaining
determinism and/or asking the comprehension question. (2)
Perhaps failure to comprehend the true meaning of determinism
reflects rejection of its truth. (3) These are abstract concepts
and participants simply do not understand them. This is a
recurring issue with research in this area, and calls into question
the value of conducting this kind of research in the first
place. To address these various possibilities, subsequent studies
used different paradigms involving different descriptions of
determinism and question phrasing to capture a broader range
of possible interpretations of these concepts.
A potential alternate explanation is that participants in
the determinism condition were simply persuaded by the
determinism argument and thereby effectively convinced that
compatibilism was true. If so, participants in the determinism
condition might not have been reporting more compatibilist
attitudes due to motives to uphold moral responsibility,
but rather because they were convinced that determinism
is compatible with free will and moral responsibility. To
address this, Study 2 manipulated motives to maintain moral
responsibility.
STUDY 2
Study 2 directly manipulated motives to hold others morally
responsible in order to test whether such motives influence
compatibilist responding. Past research has shown that motives to
punish (Clark et al., 2014) and praise (Clark et al., 2018) underlie
free will beliefs. Hence people should be more likely to agree
that compatibilist free will is sufficient for moral responsibility
when considering concrete morally virtuous and harmful actions
than when contemplating abstractly (consistent with Nichols and
Knobe, 2007). This would fit the overarching theme that people
are primarily concerned with maintaining moral responsibility,
and they adjust their beliefs and assumptions about free will on
that basis.
In Study 2, participants read an argument that people have
either libertarian free will or compatibilist free will. They were
instructed to assume the argument is correct, and then were asked
whether it makes sense to either hold people morally responsible
in general (morally neutral condition), to morally blame someone
(morally bad condition), or to morally praise someone (morally
good condition). We predicted that participants would be
more likely to report that libertarian free will is sufficient for
moral responsibility than compatibilist free will in general.
Furthermore, we predicted that there would be little to no
differences in moral responsibility ratings between the three
moral behavior conditions in the libertarian free will condition,
as moral responsibility is already satisfied in this condition.
However, in the compatibilist free will condition, participants in
the morally praiseworthy and blameworthy conditions would be
more likely to report that compatibilist free will is sufficient for
moral responsibility than those in the neutral condition.
Methods
In an online study, 370 undergraduates at a southwestern
United States university (282 female, Mage = 19.97) were
randomly assigned to read either a libertarian description of
free will, “. . . scientists have come to learn many influences on
human behavior, including genes, brain chemistry, and social
environment. . . However. . . these uncontrollable factors cannot
entirely predict human behavior with 100% certainty. . . human
behaviors are not inevitable consequences of prior causes and that
humans have the capacity to choose among alternate courses of
action. . .” or a compatibilist description of free will, “. . .scientists
have come to learn many influences on human behavior,
including genes, brain chemistry, and social environment. . . these
uncontrollable factors entirely predict human behavior with 100%
certainty. . . all human behaviors are inevitable consequences of
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prior causes. . . humans do have the capacity to act in accordance
with their own thoughts and desires. . . thoughts and actions are
links in a chain of causes.” Descriptions were written by the
authors, though aspects are similar to Murray and Nahmias
(2014).
Participants were then asked a comprehension question,
which contained a moral relevance manipulation. In the neutral
condition, they were asked, “If these scientists are correct, is
it possible for a person to behave differently than that person
ultimately does?” In the morally bad condition, they were asked,
“If these scientists are correct, is it possible that a man who
murdered his wife in order to have an affair with his secretary
could have not done so, that is, could he have not murdered his
wife?” In the morally good condition, they were asked, “If these
scientists are correct, is it possible that a man who donated 90% of
his annual salary to a pediatric cancer center could have not done
so, that is, could he have not donated 90% of his annual salary
to the pediatric cancer center?” Across all three conditions, the
correct answer was “yes” in the libertarian condition and “no”
in the compatibilist condition (though note some compatibilist
philosophers would disagree with this; we dealt with this by
varying the phrasing of this comprehension check across studies).
Next, participants were asked the primary dependent measure.
Participants in the neutral condition were asked, “If these
scientists are correct, does it make sense to hold people morally
responsible for their behavior?” Participants in the morally bad
condition were asked, “If these scientists are correct, does it make
sense to morally blame a man who murdered his wife in order to
have an affair with his secretary?” Participants in the morally good
condition were asked, “If these scientists are correct, does it make
sense to morally praise a man who donated 90% of his annual
salary to a pediatric cancer center?” Participants were then asked
to explain their answer in an open response. Last, participants
completed the same subscales of the FAD+ (Paulhus and Carey,
2011) as in Study 1, and responded to an attention check and
variety of demographic questions.
Results
Comprehension Checks
In the libertarian free will condition, 82.1% of participants
correctly understood that the actor could have done otherwise,
whereas, in the compatibilist free will condition, only 35.5% of
participants correctly understood that the actor could not have
done otherwise, once again demonstrating an incomprehension
or rejection of the notion of inability to do otherwise.
Moral Responsibility
We conducted multinomial logistic regressions with the free
will condition, dummy coded moral relevance conditions
(reference category: neutral), and the interactions predicting
moral responsibility responses. The interactions between the free
will condition and the moral relevance dummy variables were
not significant, ps > 0.280. Rather than the moral relevance
manipulation having a larger effect in the compatibilist free
will condition than the libertarian free will condition (as we
had predicted), the moral relevance manipulation had roughly
equivalent influence in both free will conditions. Because this
part of our prediction appeared to be incorrect, the interactions
were dropped from the model in order to interpret the main
effects.
As can be seen in Tables 2, 3 and Figure 2, participants were
significantly more likely to report that libertarian free will was
sufficient for moral responsibility than that it was insufficient for
moral responsibility relative to participants in the compatibilist
free will condition, with a large effect. Indeed, participants
were generally more likely to report that compatibilist free
will was insufficient for moral responsibility than that it was
sufficient.
Participants in the morally good conditions were more likely
to report that their version of free will was sufficient for moral
responsibility than that it was insufficient for moral responsibility
relative to participants not in the morally good condition with a
small to medium effect. The strongest effect in the morally bad
condition was a reduction in uncertainty such that participants
in the morally bad condition were significantly more likely
to say that their version of free will was sufficient for moral
responsibility than that they did not know whether it was
sufficient relative to those not in the morally bad condition with
a small to medium effect.
Discussion
Participants were far more likely to agree that libertarian free will
was sufficient for moral responsibility than that compatibilist free
will was sufficient. Furthermore, participants were more likely
to report that their version of free will was sufficient for moral
responsibility (than that it was not sufficient or that they did
not know whether it was sufficient) in the conditions with moral
relevance. These results, in combination with the results of Study
1, suggest that motives to maintain moral responsibility may be a
motivating factor behind compatibilist responses.
Contrary to predictions, the moral relevance condition had
roughly equal influence in the libertarian and compatibilist free
will conditions. We expected a ceiling effect in the libertarian free
will condition such that nearly all participants would agree that
libertarian free will was sufficient for moral responsibility in all
conditions. Though the majority of participants did agree that
libertarian free will was sufficient for moral responsibility in the
neutral condition (71.2%), still more agreed when considering
concrete instances of morally good (78.5%), and morally bad
(86.4%) behavior. Though this result was not predicted, it is still
consistent with our general hypothesis that motives to preserve
TABLE 2 | Moral responsibility responses by free will and moral conditions in
Study 2.
Free will condition Moral condition Yes No Don’t know
Compatibilist Good 54.7% 39.1% 6.3%
Free will Bad 41.7% 50.0% 8.3%
Neutral 33.9% 46.8% 19.4%
Libertarian Good 78.5% 9.2% 12.3%
Free will Bad 86.4% 8.5% 5.1%
Neutral 71.2% 13.6% 15.3%
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TABLE 3 | Moral responsibility compatibility results in Study 2.
Comparison OR b SE Wald p 95% CI
Free will condition Yes vs. No 7.95 2.07 0.29 50.78 <0.001 4.49, 14.06
Yes vs. DK 1.91 0.65 0.35 3.46 0.063 0.97, 3.77
Good dummy Yes vs. No 1.73 0.55 0.32 2.88 0.090 0.92, 3.24
Yes vs. DK 2.44 0.89 0.40 4.94 0.026 1.11, 5.34
Bad dummy Yes vs. No 1.32 0.27 0.32 0.73 0.392 0.70, 2.46
Yes vs. DK 3.20 1.16 0.45 6.64 0.010 1.32, 7.75
‘DK’ stands for ‘Don’t Know’ response.
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FIGURE 2 | Responses to whether people can be held morally responsible given each free will type by each moral condition in Study 2.
moral responsibility influence judgments about the very features
required for moral responsibility.
STUDY 3A
Study 3a investigated the troublesome possibility that judgments
about the compatibility of two arguments would depend on
which one they saw first. All participants were given identical free
will and determinism arguments, but the order of presentation of
the arguments was manipulated. Some participants were asked
to assume the free will argument was true and then evaluate
the compatibility of the determinism argument; others were
asked to assume the determinism argument was true and then
evaluate the compatibility of the free will argument. Of course,
compatibility between two assumptions should be bidirectionally
symmetrical. That is, if people are perfectly rational, there would
be no difference based on the sequence of reading them. But
if the guiding factor is that people are motivated to maintain
moral responsibility, participants who read the free will argument
first should be satisfied by the assumption that people have free
will and hence willing to judge determinism on its own merits–
whereas if they are first told to assume determinism, they would
want to insist on the existence of free will by finding the two
compatible. Hence the motivated reasoning perspective would
predict an order effect, such that people insist on compatibilism
when it is necessary to salvage free will – but would not care about
salvaging determinism once free will is assumed. This was our
main prediction.
As in Study 2, Study 3a also manipulated moral relevance.
In both arguments, the final sentence described the implications
for either a morally neutral behavior (a man having pasta for
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dinner) or a morally bad behavior (a man robbing a convenience
store). Participants then reported whether it is possible for the
second argument to be true if the first argument is true. We
predicted the order effect would be stronger when contemplating
the robbery than the eating of noodles. That is, people should
be most motivated to maintain belief in free will–even if that
means embracing compatibilism–when desiring to hold a bad
guy accountable.
Methods
In an online study, 356 undergraduates at a northeastern
United States university (182 female, Mage = 19.06) were told
they were going to evaluate the logical compatibility of two
arguments. They were asked to read one argument, assume
it was true (regardless of whether they personally agreed it
was true), and then evaluate whether a second argument could
then also be true, or whether the truth of the first argument
meant the second argument was necessarily false. One argument
supported the truth of determinism, “. . . scientists have come
to learn the many causes of human behavior, including genes,
brain chemistry, and social environment, and have learned that
these factors predict human behavior entirely. All human thoughts
and their corresponding behaviors are inevitable consequences
of prior events. People’s mental states (their beliefs, desires, and
decisions). . . are merely part of the causal chains that lead to their
actions. . .” whereas the other argued that people have free will
and can be held morally responsible, “. . . While many external
and internal factors interact to influence human behavior, humans
are capable of free action. Because humans have free will, they
deserve to be held responsible for their behavior. When a person
behaves in a particular way, they are responsible for having
behaved that way.” Descriptions were written by the authors,
though aspects are similar to Murray and Nahmias (2014). The
order of presentation was randomly assigned.
We also manipulated whether the argument had implications
for a morally neutral behavior (a man having pasta for dinner) or
a morally relevant action (a man robbing a convenience store).
In each argument, the final sentence of the paragraph described
the implications of that argument for either the morally neutral
behavior (e.g., after the determinism argument, “So, for example,
if a man decides to have pasta for dinner and subsequently has
pasta for dinner, given his genes, brain chemistry, and his social
history, there is no way he could have not had pasta for dinner”) or
the morally relevant behavior (e.g., after the free will argument,
“So, for example, if a man robs a convenience store, he exercised
his free will in robbing a convenience store and ought to be held
morally responsible for that action”).
Participants were then asked whether the second argument
was compatible with the first. They were told that we were not
interested in whether they personally believed either argument
was true, but simply to evaluate whether they thought the second
argument was logically compatible or incompatible with the first
argument. The response options were a compatibilist response
“If the first argument is true (that all human thoughts and
actions are predetermined/that humans have free will and are
morally responsible for their behavior), the second argument
(that humans have free will and are morally responsible for their
behavior/that all human thoughts and actions are predetermined)
CAN also be true,” an incompatibilist response (CANNOT
replaced the word CAN), or “I don’t know.” Participants were
then asked how certain they were that their answer was correct on
a 100-point sliding scale from “Not at all certain” to “Extremely
certain.”
Participants then completed two comprehension checks
about the determinism argument. The first measured bypass
comprehension: “According to (the determinism) argument, do
people’s desires, beliefs, and decisions have an effect on what
they do?,” with response options “yes,” “no,” and “I don’t know,”
the correct answer being “yes.” We then assessed otherwise
comprehension: “According to (the determinism) argument, is
it possible for a human to behave in any way other than
they ultimately do?” with response options “yes,” “no,” and “I
don’t know,” the correct answer being “no.” Participants then
reported whether they personally agreed with each argument on
a 100-point sliding scale from “Not at all” to “Entirely.” Last,
participants completed demographic questions and an attention
check.
Results
Comprehension Checks
With this description of determinism, 67.9% of participants
passed the bypass comprehension check and 67.1% passed the
otherwise comprehension check. Note, these are still quite low
considering the argument stated 1) “People’s mental states (their
beliefs, desires, and decisions) do have an effect on what they do. . .”
and the bypass comprehension question was “Do people’s desires,
beliefs, and decisions have an effect on what they do?” and 2) “No
human is ever capable of having different thoughts or behaving
in any way different than they ultimately do” and the otherwise
comprehension question was “is it possible for a human to behave
in any way other than they ultimately do?”
Argument Compatibility
A multinomial logistic regression tested whether the moral
relevance condition moderated the influence of the order
condition on compatibilist responses. As can be seen in Tables 4,
5 and Figure 3, the difference in the relative proportion of
compatibilist responses to incompatibilist responses between the
free will first and free will second argument conditions was
significantly larger in the morally relevant condition than the
morally neutral condition with a small to medium effect size.
Specifically, in the morally neutral condition, participants were
no more likely to be compatibilist when evaluating whether free
will is compatible with determinism (free will second condition;
34.1%) than when evaluating whether determinism is compatible
TABLE 4 | Compatibilist responses by order and moral conditions in Study 3a.
Order condition Moral condition Yes No Don’t know
Free will first Moral 41.6% 56.2% 2.2%
Not moral 33.7% 65.1% 1.2%
Free will second Moral 20.7% 72.4% 6.9%
Not moral 33.3% 61.9% 4.8%
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TABLE 5 | Compatibility results in Study 3a.
Comparison OR b SE Wald p 95% CI
Order condition Yes vs. No 0.96 −0.04 0.33 0.01 0.905 0.51, 1.83
Yes vs. DK 4.14 1.42 1.15 1.53 0.216 0.44, 39.39
Moral condition Yes vs. No 0.53 −0.63 0.36 3.18 0.075 0.26, 1.07
Yes vs. DK 0.43 −0.85 0.71 1.41 0.234 0.11, 1.73
Interaction Yes vs. No 2.69 0.99 0.48 4.35 0.037 1.06, 6.83
Yes vs. DK 1.49 0.40 1.44 0.08 0.782 0.09, 24.96
‘DK’ stands for ‘Don’t Know’ response. ‘Yes’ response is the reference condition.
FIGURE 3 | Compatibility responses by order condition within each moral condition in Study 3a.
with free will (free will first condition; 35%), χ2 = 0.01, p = 0.905.
However, in the morally relevant condition, participants were
more compatibilist when evaluating whether determinism can be
true if people have free will (42.5%) than when evaluating whether
people can have free will if determinism is true (22.2%),χ2 = 7.86,
p = 0.005.
Discussion
Whether two arguments are compatible ought to be independent
of which one is viewed first, but Study 3a found that the order
made a difference, at least sometimes. When told to assume
determinism was true, many people denied that free will could
also exist. In contrast, when told to assume that people have free
will, they were more compatibilist, allowing that determinism
could also be true. Moreover, this pattern only held when people
were contemplating a morally bad action (a robbery), and not
when contemplating a morally neutral action (eating pasta). Past
work has indicated that people are especially motivated to uphold
belief in free will when contemplating morally bad actions. This
motivational pattern extends to judgments about compatibilism,
according to Study 3a’s findings.
These results suggest once again that folk intuitions about
compatibilism are not reflective of some rational, coherent
process. Rather, the moral implications of arguments and
order of presentation of arguments influence these judgments.
Consistent with predictions, argument order only mattered when
the arguments had moral implications. However, within the
morally relevant condition, the pattern of results was opposite
to our predictions. We thought participants would embrace
compatibilism after being asked to assume determinism is true,
in order to preserve their belief in free will. Instead, they were
more compatibilist after assuming people have free will and
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contemplating whether determinism could also be true. We could
conclude that we had it backward, and that people are mainly
motivated to preserve belief in determinism, but that seems
intuitively implausible. Perhaps then those who were asked to
assume free will and contemplate whether determinism could
also be true were more compatibilist as a way of upholding belief
in free will and responsibility. The reason for this motivated
strategy would not be clear to us, but that is precisely the
point. Participants may not be making these judgments in a
rational fashion. They may simply respond in whatever way
seems to them most likely to uphold their belief in free will
and responsibility. Study 3b was designed as a follow-up to help
interpret the findings of Study 3a.
STUDY 3B
Rather than inferring (from inconsistent patterns of judgment)
whether compatibilist responses reflect desires to uphold
free will and moral responsibility, Study 3b directly asked
participants whether these beliefs influenced their judgments.
Study 3b was identical to Study 3a, except (1) it only included
the morally relevant condition and (2) participants also
rated the extent to which a variety of thoughts influenced
their conclusion regarding whether the arguments were
compatible. These thoughts included the assertions that free
will is true, that humans are responsible, that determinism
is false, or that their gut compelled them, among others.
Recall that participants were instructed NOT to let their
agreement with either argument influence their conclusion
and simply to consider whether the two arguments were
logically compatible. On that basis, considerations of
whether free will is true should not have influenced their
judgments.
Based on the results of Study 3a, in which participants who
read the free will argument first were more compatibilist than
those who read the free will argument second (in a morally
relevant condition), we expected that these participants would
be more likely to report that their belief in free will and
responsibility influenced their conclusion. Though it is likely
that individuals who are motivated to uphold free will and
responsibility might also be motivated to deny determinism,
it is also possible that motives to deny determinism might
increase incompatibilist responding. Because of these competing
motives, we did not have a priori predictions about whether
individuals who read the free will argument first would be more
likely to cite their disbelief in determinism as influencing their
conclusion. We also did not have a priori predictions regarding
the other reasons participants could report as influences on
their judgment, but they may nonetheless be helpful for
further understanding what kinds of considerations influence
compatibilist judgments.
Methods
The methods were nearly identical to Study 3a (n = 192
undergraduates at a northeastern United States university; 104
female, Mage = 19.41) except only the morally relevant condition
(the robbery) was presented in Study 3b, and the certainty
question was not asked. The only other difference was that
after participants reported whether the second argument was
compatible with the first, they read, “We are interested in how
you came to your conclusion on the previous page. Likely, you
had many different thoughts and considerations that influenced
your decision. Below is a list of various thoughts people have
when considering such arguments. Please indicate the extent to
which the thought influenced your conclusion.” They then read
twelve potential thoughts and rated the extent to which each
thought influenced their conclusion on 9-point scales from “Did
not influence my conclusion at all” to “Completely influenced
my conclusion.” The potential thoughts were “Human thoughts
and actions ARE/ARE NOT predetermined,” “Humans DO/DO
NOT have free will,” “Humans ARE/ARE NOT responsible
for their behavior,” “My gut says these arguments ARE/ARE
NOT compatible,” “These arguments directly support/oppose
each other,” “These arguments are unrelated to each other,”
and “I do not understand these arguments.” Note that ten of
the twelve potential thoughts were part of an opposing pair
of two questions. For each pair, one item was reverse-scored
and averaged with the opposing thought for a total of seven
potential thoughts. There was also an open-ended box for other
thoughts.
Results
Comprehension Checks
63.5% of participants passed the bypass comprehension check
and 76.6% passed the otherwise comprehension check.
Argument Compatibility
Once again, the proportion of compatibilist (26.6%) to
incompatibilist (69.1%) responses was higher among those
who evaluated whether determinism was compatible with free
will (free will first condition) relative to those who evaluated
whether free will is compatible with determinism (free will
second condition; 21.4% vs. 77.6%). However, this effect was
small, OR = 1.39, and not statistically significant, p = 0.332 (see
Table 6 and Figure 4).
Mini Meta-Analysis
Because the argument compatibility result did not reach
statistical significance, but the independent and dependent
variables were identical in Studies 3a and 3b, we conducted a fixed
effects meta-analysis (see Hedges and Vevea, 1998; Valentine
et al., 2010) of this outcome variable in Studies 3a and 3b. We
computed an r effect size from the odds ratios, which were
converted to Zrs, weighted by n−3, averaged, and then converted
back to r (Goh et al., 2016). We used Stouffer’s Z-test to estimate
statistical significance. This revealed a small, marginal effect
overall, r = 0.14, p = 0.0587.
Due to the partial replication failure of Study 3b, these results
should be interpreted with caution. However, the results of the
meta-analysis suggest that there is a small effect of the order
7Classifications of small, medium, and large effects for studies reporting rs or ds
(mini-meta, Studies 4 and 5) were interpreted using Cohen’s standards (Cohen,
1988).
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TABLE 6 | Compatibility results by order condition in Study 3b.
Compatibility
response
Free will
first
Free will
second
OR b SE Wald p 95% CI
Yes 26.6% 21.4%
No 69.1% 77.6% 1.39 0.33 0.34 0.94 0.332 0.71, 2.72
Don’t know 4.3% 1.0% 0.30 −1.21 1.16 1.10 0.295 0.03, 2.87
‘Yes’ response is reference category.
FIGURE 4 | Compatibility responses by order condition in Study 3b.
condition such that there was generally a higher proportion of
compatibilist to incompatibilist responses when participants read
the free will argument before the determinism argument than vice
versa.
Reasons for Argument Compatibility
We conducted independent samples t-tests on each thought
participants could cite as influencing their judgments (see
Table 7). The results showed that relative to participants who
read the free will argument second, participants who read the
free will argument first (the more compatibilist group) were
more likely to report that their beliefs that people have free
will and that determinism is false influenced their conclusion,
and marginally more likely to report that their beliefs that
people are responsible for their behavior influenced their
conclusion. They were also more likely to report that their
gut feeling that the arguments were compatible influenced
their conclusion. The reasons that did not significantly differ
between conditions were the extent to which they did not
understand the arguments, and the two (arguably) rational
responses: the extent to which the arguments supported or
opposed each other and the extent to which the arguments were
unrelated.
We conducted additional independent samples t-tests on
each of these thoughts between those who were compatibilist
vs. incompatibilist (collapsed across the two conditions).
Compatibilists were more likely than incompatibilists to report
that their beliefs that people have free will and that people
are responsible for their behavior influenced their conclusion.
There was a marginal tendency for compatibilists to report that
their inability to understand the arguments influenced their
conclusion. In contrast, incompatibilists were more likely to
report that their belief that determinism is false influenced their
conclusion than compatibilists. Incompatibilists were also more
likely to report that their belief that the arguments opposed each
other influenced their conclusion than compatibilists were to
report that their belief that the arguments supported each other
influenced their conclusion,8 though of course, the arguments
opposing each other is a rational reason for incompatibilism
whereas the arguments supporting each other would not be
necessary for compatibilism. Compatibilists and incompatibilists
did not differ in the extent to which their belief that the
arguments were unrelated influenced their conclusion. This is
perhaps surprising because it would be a rational reason for a
compatibilist response. Last, they did not differ in their reports
that their gut feelings influenced their conclusion, though both
groups were above the midpoint.
Discussion
As in Study 3a, participants were generally more compatibilist
when they read the free will argument first (though the pattern
was weaker in strength and short of significance) than when
they read the determinism argument first. Participants who
8For this outcome, we compared incompatibilists’ reports that the arguments
opposed each other to compatibilists’ reports that the arguments supported each
other, rather than using the average of the two with one reverse scored (as
in the experimental analyses). This was also done for the gut outcome such
that we compared incompatibilists’ reports that their gut said the arguments
were incompatible to compatibilists’ reports their gut said the arguments were
compatible.
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TABLE 7 | Reasons for argument compatibility by condition and response in Study 3b.
Reasons Free will first Free will second
M SD M SD t df p 95% CI
Free will 5.46 1.21 4.78 1.64 −3.24 190 0.001 −1.09, −0.27
Responsibility 5.28 1.29 4.87 1.68 −1.91 190 0.058 −0.84, 0.01
Determinism 4.45 1.43 3.88 1.69 −2.51 190 0.013 −1.02, −0.12
Gut 3.49 1.79 2.96 1.69 −2.09 190 0.038 −1.02, −0.03
Oppose 5.21 1.39 5.55 1.53 1.60 190 0.111 −0.08, 0.75
Unrelated 2.59 1.75 2.60 1.75 0.07 190 0.947 −0.48, 0.52
Understand 2.02 1.54 1.79 1.36 −1.12 190 0.262 −0.65, 0.18
Compatibilists Incompatibilists
Free will 5.59 1.25 4.99 1.53 2.38 185 0.018 0.10, 1.09
Responsibility 5.59 1.21 4.93 1.59 2.58 185 0.011 0.15, 1.16
Determinism 3.42 1.43 4.40 1.60 −3.68 185 < 0.001 −1.50, −0.45
Gut 4.57 1.93 4.99 1.90 −1.30 185 0.196 −1.06, 0.22
Oppose 3.37 1.66 5.72 1.50 −8.97 185 < 0.001 −2.86, −1.83
Unrelated 2.65 1.84 2.54 1.73 0.38 185 0.705 −0.48, 0.70
Understand 2.17 1.66 1.74 1.31 1.83 185 0.069 −0.03, 0.91
Interpretations of reasons (i.e., the directions of the assertions) are described in text.
read the free will argument first (the more compatibilist group)
were also more likely to report that their beliefs in free
will and responsibility influenced their conclusion than those
who read the free will argument second. All compatibilists
(regardless of experimental condition) were also more likely
than incompatibilists to report that their beliefs in free will and
responsibility influenced their conclusion. This provides the most
direct support of our hypothesis that motives to uphold free will
and moral responsibility influence compatibilist judgments.
Participants had been instructed not to let their beliefs
influence their judgments and yet openly admitted to doing
so. On the 7-point scale, a mean of 1.00 would indicate that
their beliefs about free will and responsibility did not influence
their conclusions, but the averages on these two items were
above 5.00, and over 90% reported that their beliefs in free will
and responsibility influenced their conclusion at least somewhat.
Even independent of experimental manipulations, it seems
the majority of people are unable to make judgments about
compatibilism without considering their belief that people have
free will and are responsible for their behavior (or at minimum,
people think these beliefs influenced their conclusions).
Participants who read the free will argument first (the more
compatibilist group) were also more likely than others to report
that their disbelief in determinism influenced their conclusion.
This is difficult to interpret because incompatibilists as a group
were more likely to cite their disbelief in determinism as an
influence on their conclusion than compatibilists. This could
mean there are competing motives such that motives to deny
determinism increase incompatibilist responding, but motives
to maintain free will and responsibility (which may increase
compatibilist responding) might also increase motives to deny
determinism.
What other considerations influence compatibilist judgments?
Compatibilists and incompatibilists both reported being highly
influenced by their gut feelings. Compatibilists were more likely
to say that their inability to understand the arguments influenced
their conclusion [perhaps consistent with work showing greater
incompatibilism among those with more knowledge of the
free will debate (Schulz et al., 2011)]. Even after omitting
participants who responded that they did not know whether
the arguments were compatible or incompatible, 33% reported
that their inability to understand the arguments influenced their
conclusion at least somewhat. This may mean that up to 33%
of participants who provided compatibilist or incompatibilist
judgments simply guessed despite having been provided an “I
don’t know” option.
The results of this study suggest that the order in which
arguments are presented might activate different motives, which
may then influence compatibilist judgments. The results also
suggest that participants may be somewhat self-aware of their
own motivations and reasons for drawing conclusions about
compatibilism, which include their beliefs about free will,
responsibility, determinism, their gut feelings, and even their
inability to understand the arguments, in addition to more
rational reasons such as whether the arguments contradict each
other.
STUDY 4
Study 4 sought to test whether motives to maintain moral
responsibility would lead to inconsistent compatibilist judgments
even within subjects. Participants read a determinism passage
and evaluated whether free will and moral responsibility were
compatible with that passage. Participants then read a passage
that argued that people should be held morally responsible
regardless of whether they have free will due to the deterrent
efficacy of punishment. The argument said nothing about
whether people actually have free will, but it removes one
motivation to assert free will, namely its ostensible importance
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for preserving moral responsibility. Participants then responded
to the same free will and moral responsibility questions as
before. We expected that participants would reduce free will
compatibilism, but maintain moral responsibility compatibilism.
These results would suggest that people are less inclined to
assert free will compatibilism when free will is less necessary
for preserving moral responsibility, even though the only new
information they received was irrelevant to the actual truth of free
will or compatibilism.
It is challenging to measure bias in a within-subjects design.
People feel compelled to maintain consistency in their judgments,
and insofar as they are reluctant to answer the same question
in different ways, the design may preclude finding differences
(see Uhlmann et al., 2009; Crawford et al., 2015; Winegard et al.,
2018). Nonetheless, evidence of motivated change in judgments
would contribute to the case that people furnish responses to free
will questions partly to uphold moral responsibility.
Methods
This study was preregistered for sample size, analyses, and
predictions (https://aspredicted.org/6kj35.pdf). In an online
study, 162 undergraduates at a southeastern United States
university (107 female, Mage = 18.78)9 were informed that
they would read two passages, and alternate responding to
each. Participants first read a determinism passage, which was
adapted to combine elements from Nahmias et al. (2005, 2006)
and Nichols and Knobe’s (2007) descriptions, “Everything that
happens in the universe is completely caused by what happened
before it. . . If the universe was re-created over and over again. . .
this would cause the exact same events. . . people’s mental states are
part of the causal chains that lead to their actions. . . For example,
1 day John decided to rob a convenience store. . . it had to happen
that John would decide to rob that convenience store.”
Participants were asked to assume the passage was correct
while responding to two questions, “If the argument is
correct, can people have free will?” and “If the argument is
correct, can people be held morally responsible?” on 7-point
scales from “Definitely no” to “Definitely yes.” Participants
were then directed to a second passage adapted from Clark
et al. (2017), which argued that free will is unnecessary for
moral responsibility, “. . .recently, philosophers and scientists are
realizing that free will is not a requirement for holding people
morally responsible. . . If humans know that bad behavior will be
punished, they will be less likely to perform that bad behavior.
Holding people morally responsible is not an issue of free will; it
is merely a means of discouraging behavior destructive to society.”
Participants were then asked two questions about whether
the argument supports or opposes (1) the existence of human
free will and (2) human moral responsibility, with response
options that it supports, opposes, or does neither. For purposes
of reducing demand characteristics, participants were told that
they would be responding to more questions about the second
argument, but that first they would respond to a few more
9Preregistration indicated “Whichever comes first (200 participants or the end of
the [summer] session).” The end of the summer session came first, resulting in 162
participants.
questions about the first argument, some familiar and some
new. Participants then re-read the first argument and responded
to the same free will and moral responsibility questions as
before. Participants also completed two comprehension checks
measuring bypass and otherwise comprehension, “According to
this argument, do people’s beliefs and desires have an effect on
what they do?” and “According to this argument, given the laws
of nature and the initial conditions of the universe, do later events
(including human decisions) have to happen as they do?” the
correct answer being “yes” for both questions.
For purposes of upholding the cover story, participants were
then asked to describe the second argument in their own words.
Participants also answered a number of demographic questions
and completed an attention check.
Results
In this study, 58.0% of participants passed the bypass
comprehension check, and 76.5% of participants passed the
otherwise comprehension check. A slim majority of participants
(52.5%) correctly reported that the argument that opposed the
necessity of free will for moral responsibility neither opposed or
supported the existence of human free will, and a large majority
(75.3%) correctly reported that the argument supported human
moral responsibility.
Two paired samples t-tests were conducted to determine
whether reducing the necessity of free will in order to maintain
moral responsibility would decrease reports that free will was
compatible with determinism, but have no effect on reports of
whether moral responsibility was compatible with determinism.
There was a small (marginal) effect such that participants
reported that free will was less compatible with determinism
after reading that free will is unnecessary for moral responsibility
(M = 3.97, SD = 2.11) than before (M = 3.76, SD = 2.02),
t(161) = 1.66, p = 0.098, Cohen’s d = 0.131, whereas there was
virtually no effect on moral responsibility judgments (Time 1
M = 4.41, SD = 2.12, Time 2 M = 4.33, SD = 1.94), t(161) = 0.57,
p = 0.570, Cohen’s d = 0.049.
Discussion
After considering the argument that free will is not necessary
for preserving moral responsibility, participants reduced their
reports that free will is compatible with determinism. This effect
was small and did not reach traditional levels of statistical
significance. Still, the expected pattern emerged with a within-
subjects design, in which consistency pressures would likely
attenuate any effect. Despite this limitation, Study 4 replicated
the basic pattern found in Studies 1–3b, that judgments about
free will and compatibilism are influenced by desires to preserve
important beliefs, in this case, that people can be held morally
responsible.
STUDY 5
In Studies 1–3b, compatibilist responses among the folk ranged
from 20.7 to 59.3%. Moreover, assertions of compatibilism
varied as a function of mere consideration of the truth of
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determinism, the moral implications of arguments, the order of
presentation of arguments, and explicit beliefs about free will and
moral responsibility. None of these is logically relevant to the
possible truth of compatibilism. Overall then, it seems people
are evaluating these arguments in ways that favor their preferred
beliefs about reality. To illustrate this point, we turned to a more
extreme example.
Most compatibilist philosophers do not posit that
compatibilist free will entails the existence of immaterial
souls (e.g., Monroe and Malle, 2014) or that immaterial souls
are compatible with scientific determinism. Rather, compatibilist
philosophers have defined free will as the capacity to make
rational choices in the absence of coercion, an ability consistent
with a modern, scientific understanding of the human brain.
To our knowledge, very few scholars these days believe in
the existence of immaterial souls. The United States population,
however, is quite religious, largely Christian, and likely does
maintain fairly strong belief in immaterial souls (64% believe
souls survive after death; The Harris Poll, 2013). Therefore, the
folk might be more than willing to assert that immaterial souls
are compatible with scientific determinism in order to maintain
their belief that souls exist. Study 5 tested whether people
find immaterial souls compatible with scientific determinism
(henceforth referred to as soul compatibilism). Study 5 also
tested whether those who believe in immaterial souls and those
who believe in determinism would be especially likely to report
that immaterial souls and scientific determinism are compatible.
If immaterial soul believers were more soul compatibilist, it
would demonstrate once again that people evaluate argument
compatibility in a way that allows them to maintain their prior
beliefs. If determinism believers are also more compatibilist, it
would provide additional support for Nichols’s (2007) suggestion
that compatibilism is particularly attractive for those who believe
in determinism, because it allows them to maintain other
important beliefs (free will, moral responsibility, and perhaps
immaterial souls).
Methods
Adults (n = 101; 46 female, Mage = 33.50) participated on
Amazon mechanical turk (MTurk) in exchange for a small
payment10. Participants were told they were going to evaluate the
logical compatibility of two arguments written by two different
professors at prominent universities. They were asked to read
one argument, assume it was true (regardless of whether they
personally agreed it was true), and then evaluate whether a
second argument could then also be true. The first argument
supported the truth of determinism, “. . . everything that happens
is completely caused by whatever happened before it. . . mental
states are part of the causal chains. . . Given that the past happened
the way it did, all human decisions ever made had to happen the
way they did.” This description was written to combine elements
from Nichols and Knobe (2007) and Murray and Nahmias (2014).
10For this and Study 6 (which also used MTurk workers), we included only
participants from the United States, with any HIT approval rates, and excluded
participants who had participated in any of the lead researcher’s former MTurk
studies that had relevance to free will (i.e., there was no overlap between Study 5
and Study 6 participants).
The second argued that people have immaterial souls, “. . .human
experience cannot be reduced to purely physical causes. . . The
human individual is part physical body, part immaterial soul.
When people die, the body continues to physically exist, but your
soul is no longer present in the body. This soul is the source of each
individual’s unique, subjective experience of the world. . .” This
second description was written by the authors.
Participants were then asked whether the immaterial soul
argument could possibly be true if they assumed the determinism
argument was true (regardless of whether they personally agreed),
on a 100-point sliding scale from “Definitely no” to “Definitely
yes.” Participants were then asked to explain in a few sentences
how they came to their conclusion.
Participants then completed a measure of bypass
comprehension: “According to (the determinism) argument, do
people’s desires, beliefs, and decisions have an effect on what
they do?,” with response options “yes,” “no,” and “I don’t know,”
the correct answer being “yes,” and a measure of otherwise
comprehension: “According to (the determinism) argument, is
it possible for a human to behave in any way other than they
ultimately do?” with response options “yes,” “no,” and “I don’t
know,” the correct answer being “no.” Participants then reported
whether they personally agreed with each argument on 0 (Not at
all) to 100 (Entirely) sliding scales. Last, they completed a variety
of demographics, suspicion probes, and an attention check.
Results
Descriptives
Consistent with expectations, participants generally did not
believe in scientific determinism (35.6% of participants above
the midpoint; M = 41.44, SD = 31.21), and were significantly
below the midpoint, t(100) = −2.91, p = 0.004. Also as expected,
participants generally did believe in immaterial souls (64.4% of
participants above the midpoint; M = 61.62, SD = 30.59), and
were significantly above the midpoint, t(100) = 3.65, p < 0.001.
Comprehension Check
With this description of determinism, 85.1% of participants
comprehended that determinism does not entail bypassing.
And participants did reasonably well comprehending that
determinism means that people cannot behave other than they
ultimately do, with 74.3% passing the otherwise comprehension
check.
Argument Compatibility
A single sample t-test revealed that people generally do
believe that immaterial souls are compatible with scientific
determinism (M = 60.64, SD = 30.34, 65.3% of participants
above the midpoint), which was statistically different from zero,
t(100) = 20.09, p < 0.001, and significantly above the midpoint,
t(100) = 3.36, p = 0.001. Furthermore, stronger belief in souls
(r = 0.37, p < 0.001) and stronger belief in determinism (r = 0.26,
p = 0.009) were associated with stronger soul compatibilism.
Discussion
The majority of laypersons in our sample believed immaterial
souls were compatible with scientific determinism. This sample
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was recruited from a widely used online population, and showed
evidence of relatively high conceptual sophistication, specifically
by doing better than our previous samples on the comprehension
checks. Even so, those who believed in souls and those who
believed in determinism were more likely to agree that they were
compatible11. These support the hypothesis that compatibility
judgments are influenced by personal motivations. The more
people want to believe in either souls or determinism, the more
they seek to reconcile that belief with other assertions.
To our knowledge, most compatibilist philosophers who
promote the idea that the folk are firmly in agreement with
them do not posit that immaterial souls are compatible with
deterministic universes. When it comes to issues of free will,
souls, religion, and the like, the opinion of the majority perhaps
should not be considered a legitimate source of evidence about
reality.
STUDY 6
Of course, regardless of whether compatibilist philosophers
would disagree with the folk that immaterial souls are compatible
with scientific determinism, we cannot say that such beliefs are
necessarily irrational. Study 6 sought to demonstrate that people
evaluate new information in an irrational, incoherent fashion that
favors the existence of human free will. We presented participants
with an argument about primate free will and manipulated its
implications for human free will. In one condition, participants
were told that if primates have free will, then humans do not
have the kind of free will that makes them personally responsible
for their behavior; in the other, that they do. Participants then
reported their belief in primate free will. If humans seek only to
uphold human free will, they will agree that primates have free
will when it indicates that humans also have free will, but they
will disagree that primates have free will if it diminishes human
free will.
Methods
MTurk adults (n = 201; 88 female, Mage = 34.39) participated
in exchange for a small payment. Participants were told they
would read and evaluate a passage written by a prominent biology
professor (that was actually written by the present authors) and
were randomly assigned to one of two conditions. The details of
the argument were held constant across two conditions, but the
conclusion was manipulated to indicate that if primates have free
will, the free will that makes humans personally responsible for
their behavior either does or does not exist.
Primate Free Will Argument
When it comes to decision-making, human beings and other
primates (e.g., other great apes, monkeys) have a great deal
in common. Studies suggest that chimpanzees do show some
degree of self-awareness and can anticipate how their actions
11If the majority of participants believed in both immaterial souls and scientific
determinism, they would be somewhat forced to assert compatibilism, but only
23.8% of the sample were above the midpoint on both soul belief and determinism
belief, so this combination of beliefs was relatively uncommon.
will impact the environment around them. While chimpanzees
and other great apes do show some capacity to reason, their
ability to understand cause-and-effect relationships approximates
that of human toddlers. This all raises the question of whether
chimpanzees and other primates have “free will.” In considering
the similarities and differences in cognitive functioning between
humans and other primates, we must conclude that if other
primates have free will, then the free will that makes people
personally responsible for their behavior does (not really/indeed)
exist.
Participants were then asked whether they believe other
primates have free will, whether the arguments support the
conclusion that other primates have free will, whether they
believe humans have free will, and whether the arguments
support the conclusion that humans have free will on 100-point
sliding scales from “Definitely no” to “Definitely yes.” Last,
participants completed demographics, suspicion probes, and an
attention check.
Results
We conducted a multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) on
the four outcome measures. Participants who read that primate
free will supports human free will and responsibility were more
likely to agree that primates have free will (M = 68.89, SD = 25.67)
and that the arguments supported the conclusion that primates
have free will (M = 69.65, SD = 22.53), than participants who read
that primate free will opposes human responsibility (M = 56.51,
SD = 29.24, M = 49.42, SD = 28.01, respectively), F(1,199) = 10.21,
p = 0.002, η2p = 0.05, and F(1,199) = 32.00, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.14,
with medium to large effect sizes12.
Participants who read that primate free will supports human
responsibility were also far more likely to agree that the argument
supported the conclusion that humans have free will (M = 82.51,
SD = 21.03), than participants who read that primate free
will opposes human responsibility (M = 57.31, SD = 34.92),
F(1,199) = 38.84, p < 0.001, with a large effect size, η2p = 0.16.
However, belief in human free will was virtually identical (and
very high) regardless of whether the existence of primate free will
indicated human responsibility (M = 87.75, SD = 18.93) or a lack
of human responsibility (M = 87.58, SD = 19.80), F(1,199) = 0.00,
p = 0.952, η2p = 0.00.
Discussion
Study 6 provided further evidence that layperson judgments
about free will are subject to motivated bias. All participants
read exactly the same account of how non-human primates can
think and reason. The only difference was one to two words
in the final sentence, in which the author extrapolated the
implications for humankind: the primate evidence supported
the conclusions that humans do or do not have free will and
moral responsibility. Minimizing the plausibility that participant
responses reflect normative reasoning, the information relevant
to the main dependent variable (whether primates have free
will) was identical in both conditions (i.e., both conditions
12Classifications of small, medium, and large η2p in Study 6 were interpreted from
Richardson (2011).
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described identical reasoning capacities for primates). The
manipulation only regarded the implications for human free will.
Normative reasoning counterexplanations are minimized to the
extent that the main dependent measures regard the identical
information rather than the manipulated information (Ditto
et al., 2018b; though also see Ditto et al., 2018a for a discussion
of the challenges of ruling out normative counterexplanations
completely). So, Study 6 supports the contention that people are
motivated to preserve free will.
Participants’ answers seemed designed to preserve their own
belief in free will. First, participants’ belief in human free will
was uniformly high regardless of what they read about primates
and its implications for humankind. Second, they thought the
essay supported the existence of primate free will more when it
meant humans have free will than when it meant humans did not.
Third, their own private opinions about primates changed in the
same way: They agreed that primates have free will mainly when
primate free will supported human free will and responsibility.
Once more, people appear incapable of evaluating information
that has implications for the existence of human free will in
a rational manner and rather evaluate information a way that
allows them to assert its truth.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Whether everyday people believe in free will has been the subject
of a fair amount of study. The answer appears to be a resounding
yes. Moreover, variations in the extent of this belief have been
shown to predict a wide range of attitudes and actions (e.g.,
Baumeister et al., 2009; Baumeister and Brewer, 2012; Clark
et al., 2017). That this belief influences subsequent attitudes and
behaviors seems to suggest that people not only have opinions
about free will but also that these opinions are well thought out.
This prompted experimental philosophers to ask how laypeople
think about the same dilemmas that philosophers contemplate,
such as whether free will is compatible with a deterministic
worldview. However, different researchers have reached widely
different conclusions about this, and more than a decade after this
research began, a consensus has not been reached.
The present results help clarify some of the seemingly
contradictory findings in the compatibilism literature. For
example, they provide nuance to Nichols and Knobe’s (2007)
findings that affective reactions to specific stories about immoral
behavior increase compatibilist responding and the seemingly
contradictory findings by Feltz et al. (2009), Feltz and Millan
(2013), and Feltz and Cova (2014) that affective reactions do
not influence compatibilist responding. Specifically, Feltz and
colleagues manipulated affect using only morally bad scenarios
and did not manipulate motivations to hold a specific morally
bad actor responsible (as Nichols and Knobe did, though this
was not their exact intended manipulation). If motivations to
uphold moral responsibility increase compatibilist responding,
it is not surprising that Feltz and colleagues found high rates
of compatibilism in both high and low affect morally bad
conditions and that Nichols and Knobe found high rates of
compatibilism in their morally bad condition but not in their
abstract moral responsibility condition (because exposure to
morally bad actions increases desires for moral responsibility).
Thus, the present results suggest that it is not affect per se that
increases compatibilist responding but rather desires to uphold
human moral responsibility. This also explains why Roskies and
Nichols (2008) found that people were more compatibilist about
their own universe, and why Nahmias et al. (2005) found that
people refused to deny the ability to choose to an immoral actor–
people seek to uphold the ability to hold fellow human beings
morally responsible, and particularly for morally bad actions.
The Motivation Problem
The present findings suggest that people’s responses to these
abstract dilemmas and questions are often driven by motivations
to sustain their favored beliefs–in particular their belief that
human beings have free will and deserve to be held morally
responsible for their actions. In Study 1, participants who were
asked to consider the possibility that our universe is deterministic
were more compatibilist than those not asked to consider this
possibility. In principle, whether our own universe happens to be
deterministic should be irrelevant to whether determinism and
free will can co-occur. As with Nichols’s (2007) suggestion that
compatibilism emerged among philosophers who came to accept
determinism, so the folk might similarly find compatibilism
compelling when determinism poses potential threats to moral
responsibility.
The motivation to preserve moral responsibility was apparent
in all of the present studies. In Study 2, participants who
considered concrete instances of moral behavior were more
likely to report that compatibilist (and libertarian) free will
were sufficient for moral responsibility than participants who
were asked about moral responsibility more generally. In
Study 3a, the order in which participants read free will and
determinism arguments influenced their reports of whether the
two arguments were compatible–and only when the arguments
had moral significance. Participants were more likely to report
that determinism was compatible with free will (i.e., the free
will argument came first) than that free will was compatible
with determinism (determinism argument came first). In Study
3b, participants who read the free will argument first were
particularly likely to confess that their beliefs in free will
and moral responsibility and their disbelief in determinism
influenced their conclusion, despite that they were instructed to
disregard their own beliefs. The compatibility of two positions
should be directionally symmetrical, but it appears the order of
arguments influenced participants’ compatibilist judgments as
well as the extent to which participants allowed their prior beliefs
to influence their conclusions.
In Study 4, participants reduced their belief that free will is
compatible with determinism after reading a passage that argued
that free will is unnecessary for moral responsibility. Thus, when
free will was no longer needed to preserve moral responsibility,
participants were less inclined to resolve any conflict between free
will and determinism.
Studies 5 and 6 did not directly address folk compatibilism
but demonstrated in other ways that people’s judgments are
biased toward preserving their beliefs about characteristics of
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human responsibility. In Study 5, the majority of participants
found immaterial souls compatible with a scientifically
deterministic universe, to the strongest degree when they
believed in immaterial souls or scientific determinism. In
Study 6, participants who read identical information about the
capacities of primates were far more likely to agree that primates
have free will if primate free will supported rather than opposed
human free will and responsibility. Thus, even when provided
identical information, participants evaluated information in a
way that favored the existence of human free will and moral
responsibility.
The Comprehension Problem
Complicating matters further, participants had a very
difficult time comprehending deterministic descriptions
and compatibilist free will. In Study 3b, 33% of participants who
rendered a judgment (i.e., omitting participants who responded
that they did not know whether free will and determinism were
compatible) openly admitted that their inability to understand
the arguments influenced their conclusion at least somewhat.
Across all of our studies, approximately 15–42% of participants
did not comprehend that compatibilist free will does not entail
bypassing. (That is, they did not understand that compatibilist
free will recognizes a person’s thoughts and intentions as part
of what causes behavior.) One could argue that we did a poor
job describing compatibilist free will, but this failure rate is
comparable to Murray and Nahmias’s (2014) paper, in which
the main goal was to eliminate this problem. In their Study 2,
they added language to a variety of deterministic descriptions
explicitly stating that determinism does not entail bypassing,
and still found failure rates from 12 to 49%. Thus, the present
studies are at least on par with even the best of the work currently
available.
Even more challenging was getting participants to
comprehend that determinism precludes the ability to do
otherwise given a particular chain of past causes. Across
our studies, participants failed this comprehension check
approximately 23–65% of the time. It is not entirely clear how
typical this failure rate is. Very few studies report comprehension
failures for the ability to do otherwise given that the past
happened as it did and the natural laws are as they are. In Nichols
and Knobe’s (2007) Study 2, approximately 32% of participants
failed to comprehend that in principle, in a deterministic
universe, everything that happens is predictable, but they note
there are problems interpreting this failure rate. Feltz and Millan
(2013) reported 20–36% comprehension failure rates, but these
figures combined failures to comprehend determinism and
failures to comprehend fatalism. Nahmias et al. (2005) included
questions about whether actors in a deterministic universe had
the ability to choose not to do what they did; 67% said yes when
the actor robbed a bank, whereas 45% said yes when the actor
went jogging, and 35% said yes when the actor saved a child.
Whether these are comprehension failures is up for debate, but
at least they suggest that how people comprehend deterministic
scenarios appear vulnerable to moral responsibility motives as
well. In addition to the problem of moral responsibility motives,
it is clear that the folk struggle a great deal with understanding
compatibilist free will and determinism in the way philosophers
do. And to our knowledge, nobody has successfully dealt with
this issue (ourselves included).
It is possible that everyday people simply cannot understand
the nuances of these crucial concepts. Given this challenge, it
is critical that future research on folk compatibilism includes
appropriate comprehension questions and reports these results,
practices that are currently rare in the field.
Quibbles and Qualms
Some compatibilists may quibble with some of our descriptions
of determinism, perhaps especially the descriptions asserting
that in deterministic universes, people “lack the capacity to
choose among alternative courses of action” (or similar).
Many incompatibilists would accept this description, but some
compatibilists would argue that it is misleading. Even in a
deterministic universe, people have the capacity to do otherwise
in the sense that they could have done otherwise if something
about the past or laws of nature had been otherwise (e.g.,
Vihvelin, 2004; Turner and Nahmias, 2006). In other words, had
the initial conditions of the universe or the laws of nature been
different, an individual could have done something different from
what they did in the present universe. Therefore, they do have the
capacity to do otherwise.
One could reasonably speculate that when regular people
think about the ability to do otherwise, they do not think their
ability to do otherwise is constrained to alternate relevant possible
worlds with different natural laws. In fact, motives to hold
individuals morally responsible may influence whether people
believe the ability to do otherwise is possible in a deterministic
universe (Nahmias et al., 2005). Thus, the issue of whether the
folk believe that the ability to do otherwise is possible in a
deterministic universe (like many compatibilist philosophers)
may be vulnerable to the same motivations as their evaluations of
whether moral responsibility is possible with this limited variety
of the ability to do otherwise.
As experimental philosophers could attest, designing studies
with descriptions of determinism that satisfy all perspectives
is challenging. We sought to avoid taking sides on the
alternative universe issue, particularly because we suspect that
such subtleties did not much preoccupy our research participants.
Hence our procedures across multiple studies were designed
to cater variably to the different perspectives. First, we used
multiple descriptions of determinism across our studies and
different comprehension checks that varied in multiple ways,
including in their charitability to compatibilist vs. incompatibilist
philosophers. For example, some of our studies stipulated
that in a deterministic universe, a person would make a
particular decision only if specific events occurred (Study 1),
given the initial conditions of the universe and the laws of
nature (Study 4), and given that the past happened the way it
did (Study 6). Hopefully, these satisfy compatibilists. Second,
we were careful to describe determinism in such a way
that does not entail the problem of bypassing (e.g., “people’s
mental states do have an effect on what they do,” “humans
do have the capacity to act in accordance with their own
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thoughts and desires”), another distinction that is important to
compatibilists.
Summary and Suggestions for Future
Work
We found variation in compatibilist responding depending on
the moral relevance of arguments, the order of arguments,
exposure to deterministic arguments, and agreement with
arguments. But the present work is far from the first to note that
framing effects can influence compatibilist responding. Roskies
and Nichols (2008) take an optimistic view on the matter.
They argue that the patterns of judgment are not random and
incoherent and that we can make predictions about when the
folk will be compatibilist. One might then consider what the
optimal conditions are for assessing whether the folk are generally
intuitive compatibilists. That is, under what conditions are the
folk’s intuitions useful for deciding whether the burden of proof
falls on compatibilists or incompatibilists to make their case for
moral responsibility or a lack thereof? It seems philosophers
go through painstaking efforts to get the folk to make these
judgments in a sober, reflective, cognitively effortful manner to
understand the true nature of their intuitions. They attempt to
get the folk to approach the issue the same way they do.
In the real world, however, people typically hold others
morally responsible when there has been a moral infraction.
Then it might be cases in which people are considering concrete
instances of morally bad behavior that have the most relevance
to reality, even if in such cases people are the most likely to
disregard reason and hold people morally responsible regardless
of mitigating circumstances.
People do believe strongly in free will, and these beliefs affect
their behavior in a variety of ways. These beliefs are not trivial
and should be studied. However, the folk likely are not concerned
with the metaphysical requirements for moral responsibility and
instead simply care about holding people morally responsible
when it is desirable and not manifestly unreasonable to do so.
Indeed, holding fellow human beings morally responsible for
their misbehavior appears crucial for living in social groups (e.g.,
Clutton-Brock and Parker, 1995; Henrich et al., 2006, 2010)–and
this is true regardless of how one defines free will, and regardless
of whether people have it. This likely explains why people seem
to have free-will-no-matter-what intuitions (Feltz and Millan,
2013) and non-negotiable beliefs in human choice and control
(Nahmias and Thompson, 2014).
It may not be fruitful or even coherent to assert definitively
that folk have either compatibilist or incompatibilist intuitions
(e.g., Feltz and Cokely, 2009; Schulz et al., 2011). They probably
have both (Deery et al., 2014) and may not regard them
as inconsistent with each other. For comparison, consider
religious adherents. They often assert that they believe in official
doctrine, e.g., that God can see all things at once, but when
tested in the laboratory, they appear to find it more intuitive
that God must visually scan one thing before seeing another
and thus perceives more like a human than an omnipotent
and omniscient entity. Barrett (1999) termed this Theological
incorrectness, and contended that religious folk simultaneously
hold multiple, sometimes contradictory, representations about
religious entities. Intuitively, folk probably default to a rather
human-like representation of God; however, they may use
a different representation when deliberating about God in a
theology seminar. The religious representation is impelled by
the demands of the situation. The same probably holds for free
will. People have multiple representations, some which possibly
contradict each other.
Free will belief may stem largely from an intuitive feeling
that one acts freely (Wegner, 2002), and applying this intuition
to everyday life is likely far less cognitively demanding than
logically evaluating the compatibility of free will with complex
artificial universes. Like soul mates, souls, fate, and other abstract
metaphysical concepts, people likely do not have consistent,
coherent notions of free will, and they are likely incapable of
reasoning about these concepts in the way philosophers would
like them to.
We are optimistic about the project of experimental
philosophy. However, we believe that for understanding how
ordinary people represent abstruse concepts such as free will, the
laboratory is likely to be uninformative, perhaps even confusing.
This does not mean that the general goal of understanding what
the folk consider necessary for moral judgments and what they
mean when they use the terms “free” and free will” is misguided.
After all there are billions of people on the planet and very
few of them are philosophers. Folk beliefs about free will are
much more consequential than the views of a small fraction of
the population with degrees in philosophy. The error is not the
pursuit of understanding how the folk use the word “free will,”
but rather the expectation, made by some, that they use the word
rationally or systematically.
We believe, along with others in the experimental philosophy
tradition (e.g., Knobe and Nichols, 2008; Hansen, 2014), that an
analysis of ordinary language usage would be more edifying. We
can imagine, for example, a kind of philosophical ethnography
that describes and analyzes the way concepts such as free will
are used and function during conversation and debate and also
in newspaper articles and blogs that are aimed at intelligent
laypeople (Sytsma and Buckwalter, 2016). This would allow
purchase on the many (and possibly contradictory) ways in which
the terms “free” and “free will” are used in ordinary conversation,
allowing philosophers and other analysts a glimpse into the folk
mind without the unrealistic expectation that the folk use the
term consistently or that they have only one representation for
“free will.”
Perhaps in free flowing, intellectually undemanding
conversations, for example, the folk generally use “free
will” to mean “acted in accordance with desire without
external constraint.” But in more intellectual conversations,
conversations about higher level concepts, the folk use “free
will” to mean, “acted without internal or external cause.” Then
philosophers could see if the folk, in everyday intellectual
conversations, seem to believe that free will is compatible
with scientific determinism. This, we believe, would be a more
genuine approximation of folk beliefs because it would illustrate
how they think about the concept when not compelled to accept
(or not) scientific determinism by a vignette on a computer for
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an experiment. Do the folk discount talk about determinism in
everyday discourse? Do they argue against it in favor of free will?
Or do they seem to talk about free will in a way that is consistent
with scientific determinism? (Again, keeping in mind that they
likely have more than one representation that corresponds to
“free will”).
In other words, philosophers should get out of the lab and into
the wild.
CONCLUSION
Beliefs in free will probably arise for myriad reasons. Many
philosophers who have explored the free will intuitions of the
folk have tried to ascertain whether the folk are compatibilists
or incompatibilists, that is, whether they believe that free
will can be reconciled with a deterministic universe. But this
is an abstruse philosophical question, one that even highly
educated philosophers stumble over. Our findings suggest that
researchers should be alert to the motivations, inconsistencies,
misunderstandings, and other inadequacies in the answers people
furnish regarding philosophical dilemmas. Everyday people
may not be capable of furnishing meaningful and coherent
conclusions about such challenging philosophical questions.
Rather, they are content with the conclusion that people have free
will, regardless of what it is, and that people who commit moral
transgressions should be punished for failing to exercise that
free will properly. These motives to uphold free will and moral
responsibility may explain many of the discrepant findings in the
experimental philosophy literature. Judgments with significance
to human moral responsibility (e.g., judgments about human
behavior, and particularly harmful human behavior) will motivate
individuals to accommodate their desires to uphold human
free will and moral responsibility–regardless of experimentally
imposed constraints.
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